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Self-reporting-the  reporting  by  parties  of  their  own  behavior  to 
an  enforcement  authority-is  a commonly  observed  aspect  of  law 
enforcement,  such  as  in  the  context  of  environmental  and  safety 
regulation.  We  add  self-reporting  to  the  model  of  the  control  of 
harmful externalities  through  probabilistic law enforcement,  and we 
characterize  the  optimal  scheme.  Self-reporting  offers  two  advan- 
tages  over  schemes  without  self-reporting:  enforcement  resources 
are  saved  because  individuals  who  report  their  harmful  acts need 
not be detected,  and risk is reduced  because individuals who report 
their behavior  bear certain  rather than uncertain  sanctions. 
I.  Introduction 
A  commonly  observed  feature  of  law  enforcement  is  what  we  shall 
call  self-reporting  of  behavior:  the  reporting  by  parties  of  their  own 
harm-producing  actions  to  an  enforcement  authority.  For  example, 
firms  frequently  report  environmental  and  safety  violations,  individu- 
als  often  report  accidents  they  cause  to  the  police,  and  even  those 
who  commit  crimes  sometimes  confess  their  acts  to  the  authorities. 
Presumably,  parties  voluntarily  report  their  behavior  because  they 
fear  more  severe  treatment  if  they  do  not.' 
We  are  grateful  to  Christine Jolls,  A.  Mitchell  Polinsky,  Richard  Zeckhauser,  and 
anonymous  referees  for helpful  comments;  to the John  M. Olin Foundation  and the 
National  Science  Foundation  for  financial  support;  and  to David  Elsberg  and  Brian 
Timmons  for research  assistance. 
1 Notably,  under  the  Comprehensive  Environmental  Response,  Compensation,  and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.,  sec. 9603(b),  failure to report the release of hazard- 
ous substances may result in fines or imprisonment,  apart from any penalty associated 
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What are the  social advantages  of  self-reporting  that may help  to 
explain  its  use  in  law  enforcement?  More  broadly,  how  does  self- 
reporting  fit in  the  theory  of  the  control  of  harmful  externalities? 
The  literature on controlling  externalities,  dating from Pigou (1920), 
suggests that activities that create harm be taxed but does not empha- 
size the costs of identifying  parties who cause harm. The  more recent 
literature  on  law enforcement,  however,  investigates  the  control  of 
harmful  activities when  it is costly to identify  the  parties responsible 
for  causing  harm.  This  literature  begins  with  Becker  (1968),  who 
stresses that, because  of  enforcement  costs, it is not socially advanta- 
geous to identify those who cause harm all the time but rather to do so 
only with a probability (and to raise the level of sanctions accordingly). 
In this article, we add  self-reporting  to the  model  of  probabilistic 
law enforcement.2  Under  a scheme  with  self-reporting,  individuals 
can be induced  to report their harmful acts without materially affect- 
ing their incentives  to refrain  from committing  the acts.3 This  can be 
accomplished  by allowing those who report committing  a harmful act 
to pay a sanction  equal to (or slightly less than) the certainty equiva- 
lent  of  the  sanction  they  would  face  if  they  did  not  report  the  act. 
Then  individuals  will be  led  to  report  their  acts, but  deterrence  of 
acts will be unchanged.  As a consequence,  enforcement  schemes with 
self-reporting  offer  society  two  advantages.  First,  enforcement  re- 
sources  are  saved:  because  those  who  commit  harmful  acts are  in- 
duced to report their behavior,  enforcement  effort  need not be spent 
identifying  them.  Second,  risk-bearing costs are eliminated  (a benefit 
with the release itself. Under  federal law and some state laws, corporations  and individ- 
uals are required  to report  violations  of product  safety statutes and face penalties  for 
not  doing  so (see,  e.g.,  Consumer  Product  Safety  Act,  15 U.S.C.,  sec. 2064).  Federal 
criminal  sentencing  guidelines  specify  that organizations  that do  not  report  their of- 
fenses  suffer  harsher  treatment  than  if they  do.  Federal  and  state laws also stipulate 
that individuals  who do not report  a variety of crimes and harmful  acts suffer  greater 
sanctions  than  those  who  do.  For  instance,  hit-and-run  statutes  generally  make  a 
driver's failure  to report  an accident  a crime. 
2 A number  of articles in the mechanism  design  literature addressed  to risk-sharing 
contracts, tax collection,  regulation,  and the principal-agent  model  are relevant to our 
analysis because they examine  the costly auditing of reports. See, in particular, Border 
and Sobel (1987), Wagenhofer  (1987), and Mookherjee and Png (1989). See also Town- 
send  (1979),  Baiman  and Demski  (1980),  Baron and Besanko  (1984),  Reinganum  and 
Wilde  (1985),  Dye  (1986),  Scotchmer  (1987),  and  Mookherjee  and  Png  (1990).  We 
comment  on  this  literature  in  n.  25.  In  the  literature  on  law enforcement,  the  only 
article  analyzing  self-reporting  is Malik (1993),  which  was written  independently  of 
our original working  paper  (Kaplow and Shavell  1991). See also Kaplow (1992),  which 
incorporates  self-reporting  when  analyzing  other  issues. 
3 For concreteness,  we  speak  here  of  individuals  who  report  acts that cause  harm 
with certainty. But our analysis applies as well to situations in which individuals' actions 
result in harm only with a probability and what they report is the occurrence  of harm. 
For example,  a firm might take precautions  to reduce  the risk of discharge of a pollut- 
ant and report  discharges  when  they occur. OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  585 
when actors are risk-averse), because those who commit harmful  acts 
report  their behavior  and pay a certain amount.4 By contrast, under 
law enforcement  systems  without  self-reporting,  those  who  commit 
harmful  acts bear the risk of  sanctions. 
In Section  II,  we analyze  a model  of  self-reporting  in which  risk- 
neutral individuals  choose  whether  to commit  a single type of harm- 
ful act; in Section  III, we examine  a generalization  of the model  that 
allows for many types of harmful  acts. In these models,  we character- 
ize optimal  enforcement  schemes  with self-reporting  and  show  that 
they are superior  to schemes  without  self-reporting  because  the for- 
mer allow enforcement  costs to be reduced.  We also demonstrate  that 
a positive level of enforcement  is always desirable with self-reporting 
even  though  it is not necessarily  desirable  without  self-reporting.  In 
Section  IV,  we  consider  risk aversion,  imprisonment  as a sanction, 
error  in  examination  of  behavior,  and  administrative  costs  of  self- 
reporting.  In Section  V, we observe  that, depending  on the  method 
of enforcement,  the advantages of self-reporting  may be greater than 
in  our  model  or  nonexistent,  and  we  offer  further  concluding  re- 
marks. 
II.  The  One-Act  Model 
Risk-neutral individuals  choose  whether  or not to commit an act that 
causes a harm h. (Our analysis would be essentially the same if harm 
were  probabilistic;  see  n.  12.) If an individual  commits  the  harmful 
act, he  obtains  a benefit  b E  [0, oc); b differs  among  individuals  and 
has positive continuous  densityf(-)  with cumulative  distribution F(-).5 
The  size of the  population  is normalized  to one. 
We now define  and analyze two schemes  of enforcement:  enforce- 
ment  without  self-reporting  and enforcement  with self-reporting. 
A.  Enforcement  without  Self-Reporting 
In the  scheme  without  self-reporting,  the  social authority  examines 
individuals  with probability p. An examination  accurately determines 
whether an individual  committed  the harmful act, and each examina- 
4 A related  advantage  is that schemes  with self-reporting  reduce  the need  to impose 
imprisonment,  as we discuss in Sec.  IVB. 
5 The  assumption  that b has positive  density  on  [0,  xc) rules out  the  possibility that 
it is desirable  to deter  all individuals  from  committing  the harmful  act. If, however,  b 
were distributed  on  [0, b] and h >  b, then  it would  be desirable  for no one  to commit 
the harmful  act. In this case, complete  deterrence  may not be optimal  (because of the 
high enforcement  costs that would be required),  in which event our analysis and results 
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tion costs c.6 Individuals  found  to have committed  the act pay a mone- 
tary sanction s, which is assumed  to be socially costless to impose.  The 
maximum  level of the sanction is s, where -S  h; s may be interpreted 
as an individual's  wealth.7 The  authority  chooses  the  probability of 
examination  and  the  sanction  to maximize  social welfare,  defined  as 
the sum of individuals' benefits  minus the harm due to their acts and 
examination  costs. Socially optimal values of variables will be denoted 
by an asterisk. 
An individual  will commit  the harmful  act if and only if b -  ps, so 
that social welfare  is 
0x 
W=  f(b  -  h)f(b)db  -  pc.  (1) 
ps 
The  first term  is the  benefits  minus  the  harm  from  commission  of 
the act. The  second  term is the enforcement  cost, because  the entire 
population  (which,  recall,  is  normalized  to  one)  is  examined  with 
probability p and each examination  costs c. 
The  optimal s must be s if p*  >  0.8  Were s* <  s, s could  be raised 
and p lowered  such that ps remained  constant. Then  the first term in 
(1) would be unchanged  but enforcement  costs, pc, would fall; welfare 
would  thus be higher,  contradicting  the optimality of s*. (This is the 
argument  of  Becker  [1968].) 
To  determine  p*, differentiate  (1) with respect  to p, using s*  =  s, 
to obtain 
dW 
-=  s  (h -  p3)  f (p3) -  c.  (2) 
dp 
This  expression  will be  negative  for  all p  E  [0,  1] if c is sufficiently 
large, so p*  =  0 is possible.  However,  p*  =  1 is not possible because 
the  assumption  that s  ?  h implies  that  (2) is negative  at p  =  1. An 
interior  solution  for  p*  must  satisfy  the  first-order  condition  that 
dW/dp  =  0.9 In this case, the optimal  probability is determined  by 
h -  c/[3f(p*s)] 
6 Other  methods  of  enforcement  are discussed  in Sec. V. 
7The  assumption  that s  2  h is used  to  rule  out  the  corner  solution  in which  the 
optimal  probability equals one.  As explained  in n. 21, our main results do not depend 
on this assumption. 
8 If p*  =  0, s* can be taken to equal S. 
9 Here  and below,  we do  not  discuss the  possibility of  multiple  optima  because  this 
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and the optimal  expected  sanction  is determined  by 
p  =  h  -  (4) 
The  left  side  of  (4)  is  the  social  loss  from  deterring  the  marginal 
individual,  because  he  would  have obtained  a benefit  of p*s had  he 
committed  the act. The  right side is the net social gain from deterring 
the  marginal  individual,  the  harm  avoided  minus  the  enforcement 
cost of  deterring  him. 
In summary,  we have the following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1. When  there  is no  self-reporting,  (a) the  optimal 
probability of  examination  p*  may be zero;  (b) if p* is positive,  it is 
given by equation  (3), and the optimal sanction is the maximum  feasi- 
ble sanction 3. 
B.  Enforcement  with Self-Reporting 
In the scheme  with self-reporting,  if an individual  admits to commit- 
ting  a harmful  act, he  pays an ex  ante  sanction  r (r '  s), and  he  is 
not examined.'0  If an individual  does  not  report  that he  committed 
the act, he is treated  as he was in the scheme  without  self-reporting: 
he is examined  with probability p, and if the examination  reveals that 
he committed  the act, he pays an ex post sanction s. 
Individuals  who  do  not  commit  the  harmful  act clearly  will  not 
report  having  committed  it. Individuals  who  do commit  the  act will 
report  this if and only if r c  ps."  Hence,  individuals  commit  the act 
if  and  only  if  b -  min(r,  ps). There  are  thus  two  cases.  If  r  >  ps, 
individuals  who  commit  the  act do  not  report  it, and  welfare  is as 
given  in (1). That  is, enforcement  without  self-reporting  is a special 
case of  enforcement  with  self-reporting.  If  r  ?  ps,  individuals  who 
commit  the act report  it, and  social welfare  is 
rx  W=  (b -  h)f(b)db -  pcF(r).  (5) 
Expressions  (5) and  (1) differ  in two respects.  First, the  lower  limit 
of integration  in (5) is r rather than ps, because individuals who com- 
mit the  act report  it and  bear the  certain  sanction  r rather than  the 
expected  sanction  ps.  Second,  the  examination  cost  in  (5)  is pcF(r) 
10  The  sanction r is called an ex ante sanction because it is paid before  an individual 
might  be  examined.  In  the  sequence  of  events  that  we  describe,  however,  r is paid 
after an individual commits the act (although  we could also imagine r to be paid before 
an individual  commits  the act). 
11  As  is  the  convention,  we  assume  that  when  individuals  are  indifferent  be- 
tween  reporting  the  truth and  not doing  so-when  r =  ps-they  tell the truth. 588  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
rather than pc, because  only  individuals  who  do  not  commit  the  act 
(and thus do not report committing  it)-those  with benefits less than 
r-are  examined. 
We can now make precise  the argument  sketched  in the introduc- 
tion that enforcement  with self-reporting  can induce the same behav- 
ior as enforcement  without self-reporting  but at a lower enforcement 
cost. Let p >  0 and s apply without self-reporting.  With self-reporting, 
use the same p and s and set r = ps. Then  it is apparent that the same 
individuals  commit  the  act  with  self-reporting  as  without  self- 
reporting,  so the integrals  in (1) and (5) are equal.  But enforcement 
costs  are  lower  with  self-reporting  by  [1  -  F(ps)]pc,  because  those 
who commit the act report this and are not examined.  Thus,  we have 
the following  proposition.'2 
PROPOSITION  2. Given  any enforcement  scheme  (involving p >  0) 
without  self-reporting,  there  exists a scheme  with self-reporting  un- 
der which behavior  is the same but enforcement  costs are lower. 
The  comparison  made  in this proposition  understates  the  advan- 
tage  of  the  optimal  self-reporting  scheme  over  the  optimal  scheme 
without  self-reporting,  because  the  optimal  probabilities  under  the 
two schemes  generally  differ. 
We  now  characterize  the  optimal  enforcement  scheme  with  self- 
reporting.  First, the optimum  will involve r = ps. If r >  ps, individuals 
who commit  the act would  not report it, which proposition  2 implies 
cannot be optimal.  If r < ps, p could be lowered  slightly, maintaining 
the inequality.  Then  individuals  who commit  the act would continue 
to report  it and  pay r, so the  integral  in  (5) would  not  change.  But 
the  reduction  in p  would  reduce  the  second  term,  increasing  wel- 
fare.'3 Second,  the optimal ex post sanction is s: as in the case without 
self-reporting,  this sanction  economizes  enforcement  resources. 
To find the optimum,  we may substitute ps for r in (5) and differen- 
tiate with respect  to p to obtain 
dW  h  d = s(h -  p3)f(p3)  -  pcsf(p3) -  cFlp3).  (6) 
12 The  arguments  leading  to this result would be virtually the same if harm occurred 
with probability  ar  and individuals  were  required  to report  harm caused by their acts. 
Given  that  harm  occurs,  individuals  would  report  this  if  and  only  if r c  ps, just  as 
when  harm occurs with certainty. They  would  decide  to commit  the act if and only if 
b 2  min(irr, irps) rather than when  b 2  min(r, ps). Thus,  if r c  ps, (5) becomes 
W=  f  (b -  h)f(b)db  -  pc[l  -  ar +  rF(r)], 
and  proposition  2  follows.  Similarly,  the  analysis  and  conclusions  in  the  rest  of 
our paper  would  be essentially  unchanged  if harm were  assumed  to be probabilistic. 
13We have implicitly assumed  that p*  >  0 in making  this argument.  But if p*  =  0 
(a possibility that we rule out below), r can be taken to equal zero (which is p*s)  since 
welfare  will be independent  of r. OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  589 
At p  =  0,  the  derivative  equals  shf(O), which  is positive,  so that p* 
must  be  positive.  By  contrast,  p*  =  0  was  possible  without  self- 
reporting  if examination  costs were sufficiently  high. The  reason  for 
the  difference  is that,  without  self-reporting,  the  entire  population 
needs  to be  subject to examination,  so that the  marginal  cost of  in- 
creasing p is c. With self-reporting,  only those individuals who do not 
report  having  committed  the  act need  to be  subject to examination; 
but there  are no  such  people  when p  =  0 (F(r)  =  0 since r  =  ps  = 
0), so the marginal enforcement  cost at that point is zero. The  possi- 
bility that p*  =  1 is again ruled out by the assumption that  -  ?  h. Since 
an interior solution obtains, p* satisfies dW/dp =  0, which implies that 
h -  cF(p*3)![3f(p*s)]  7 
s  +  c 
or 
p*s  = h -  p*c  -cF(p  )  (8) 
Equation  (8) is analogous  to (4). The  left  side is the social loss from 
deterring  the marginal  individual  (for his benefit  from the act is r*, 
which  equals p*s  at the  optimum).  The  right  side  is the  net  social 
gain from deterring  the marginal individual, the harm avoided minus 
the  enforcement  cost  of  deterring  him.  The  latter has  two compo- 
nents  in this case: p* c, the  expected  cost of examining  the marginal 
individual, who, because he has been deterred, joins the pool of those 
who  do  not  commit  the  act  and  thus  might  be  examined;  and 
cF(p*s)/3f(p*3),  the  inframarginal  cost  of  examining  with  a higher 
probability those  who  do not commit  the act. 
We can interpret r*, which equals p* s in (8), as the optimal Pigovian 
tax for committing  the harmful  act, because  this is the amount  indi- 
viduals  pay with  certainty  when  they  commit  the  act (since  all who 
commit  the  act are induced  to report  this and  pay r*). The  optimal 
tax is less than  the  harm-the  externality  is not fully internalized- 
because  of enforcement  costs.14 
Let us summarize. 
PROPOSITION  3.  When  there  is self-reporting: 
a)  In the  optimal  scheme,  all individuals  who  commit  the  harmful 
act report  having  acted  and  no  individuals  who  do  not  commit 
the act report  having  acted. 
b)  It  is  optimal  to  expend  enforcement  resources  to  deter  some 
14 However,  the optimal  Pigovian tax may exceed  the harm for some acts in the n-act 
model  of  Sec. III. 590  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
individuals  from committing  the harmful act: the optimal proba- 
bility of  examination  is positive. 
c)  The  optimal  probability p* is given  by equation  (7), the optimal 
ex post sanction is the maximum  feasible sanction s, and the opti- 
mal ex ante  sanction  r* equals p*s. 
We may now conclude  that the optimal  self-reporting  scheme  is 
superior  to that without  self-reporting.  Proposition  2 establishes that 
welfare is higher  with self-reporting  than without it for any common 
positive probability of enforcement.  If p*  =  0 without self-reporting, 
which is possible,  welfare  is equivalent  for p  =  0 with self-reporting, 
but p  =  0 is not optimal  with self-reporting  by part b of  proposition 
3. Hence,  we have the following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  4.  The  optimal  self-reporting  scheme  is superior  to 
the optimal  scheme  without  self-reporting. 
Finally, we compare  the optimal  probabilities of  examination  with 
and without  self-reporting,  using  equations  (4) and (8). The  optimal 
probabilities  generally  differ  because  the costs of deterring  the mar- 
ginal individual  differ.  On one  hand,  this marginal enforcement  cost 
tends to be lower with self-reporting  because an increase in the proba- 
bility  of  examination  applies  only  to  deterred  individuals.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  marginal  enforcement  cost tends  to be higher  with 
self-reporting  because an increase in the probability enlarges the pool 
of  individuals  subject to examination  by deterring  more  individuals 
(an effect  not  present  without  self-reporting  because  all individuals 
are  in  the  pool  in  any  event).  Either  of  these  tendencies  could  be 
dominant,  so  that  the  optimal  probability  with  self-reporting  could 
be either  higher  or lower  than  the  optimal  probability without  self- 
reporting. 15 
III.  The  n-Act  Model 
The  model  in Section  II can be generalized  as follows.  There  are n 
harmful  acts,  and  act  i  causes  harm  hi,  0  <  h  I  <  .  . .  hn. The 
population  is divided  into  groups  of  size  0,; individuals  in  group  i 
choose  between  not acting  and committing  the act that causes  harm 
h,.'6 For convenience,  not acting is sometimes  referred  to as commit- 
15 To  illustrate, consider  the case in which f()  is uniform  on  [0,  1]. Subtracting the 
right side of  (3) from  the right  side of  (7) yields 
c[(2cls)  +  1 -  2h] 
s(s + 2c) 
The  numerator  obviously  can be positive  or negative. 
16 At  the  end  of  this  section,  we  consider  the  case  in  which  each  individual  may 
choose  any of the n acts. OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  591 
ting  act  0.  When  the  authority  conducts  an  examination,  it learns 
both whether  a harmful  act was committed  and, if so, what type of act 
was committed.  Otherwise,  the assumptions  are as before:  individuals 
obtain a benefit b if they commit a harmful  act, where b is distributed 
according tof(-);  examinations  cost c; and the maximum feasible sanc- 
tion  is S >  hn- 
A.  Enforcement  without  Self-Reporting 
Because  an  individual  in  group  i will commit  a harmful  act if  and 
only  if  b  ps1, where  s1 is the  sanction  for  committing  act i, social 
welfare  is 
w  Z oL  (b  -  hi)f(b)db  -  pc  (9) 
Thus, 
W =  Oip(hi -  ps  )f(psi).  (10)  ds. 
Assume  that p*  >  0.  It then  follows  from  (10) that the  optimum  is 
si* =  hI/p* if this is feasible,  that is, if hilp*  -  S. Otherwise,  si* =  S. 
In other words, optimal sanctions rise with the level of harm and lead 
to first-best behavior  (individuals  commit  harmful  acts if and only if 
their benefit  exceeds  the harm) until the maximum  feasible  sanction 
is reached;  any acts subject to this sanction  are underdeterred.  Let I 
denote  the set of i for which si* =  S. Then  we have 
dW 
A,  S-  (hi -  p3)  f(p3)  -  c.  ( 11) 
dp  l 
Thus,  as in the  one-act  model,  the  optimum  involves p*  =  0 if c is 
sufficiently  large.  If p* is positive,  (11) is zero.  In this case, the set I 
cannot  be  empty  (it must  include  n), for  otherwise  (11)  is negative. 
We now can state the  following  analogue  of  proposition  1.L7 
PROPOSITION  5. When there is no self-reporting  in the n-act model, 
(a) the optimal  probability of examination  p* may be zero; (b) if p* is 
positive, its level is determined  by setting (1 1) equal to zero; the opti- 
mal sanction si* for acts of  type i is h1lp* if this is feasible  and  is the 
maximum  feasible  sanction s otherwise. 
B.  Enforcement  with Self-Reporting 
Now suppose  that individuals  must report a type of act: a number  in 
the set {0, 1, ..  . , n}. Individuals  who report i pay an ex ante sanction 
17 This  result  appears  in Shavell (1991). 592  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ri; they are then  examined  with probability pi and,  if examined,  pay 
an ex post sanction si,, where jis  their true act. The maximum amount 
that an individual  may be, sanctioned,  r- +  sij, is s, and  all sanctions 
are  nonnegative.'8  The  social  authority  chooses  an  enforcement 
mechanism-a  set of ri, pi,  and sij  -to  maximize  social welfare. 
Because  the  revelation  principle  applies,'9  attention  may be  con- 
fined to mechanisms  in which individuals  who commit act i truthfully 
report  i. We then  can use  the  fact that the  optimal  scheme  induces 
truth telling  at minimum  enforcement  cost to establish three  results 
(see the Appendix).  First, the optimal ex post sanctions may be taken 
to involve  the  maximal  penalty  for  lying  and  no  penalty  for  telling 
the truth. That  is, 
si5  =s--r,,  fori7j,  (12) 
and 
S  =O.  (13) 
Second,  those  who report  not having  acted are not sanctioned,  so 
r* =  0.  (14) 
Third,  the probabilities of examination  for a given set of ri must obey 
r -  ri  (15) 
s  -  r( 
where -r  denotes  the highest  of the ri. It follows from  (15) that if ri = 
r, then pi  =  0; also, if ri >  rj, then Pi < Pj. 
Because individuals  report the truth and, when doing  so, bear only 
the ex ante sanction,  their (expected)  sanction for committing  act i is 
simply ri. Thus,  an individual  in group  i commits  act i if and only if 
b-ri,  so social welfare  can be written as 
W =  E  (b -  hi)f(b)db  -  c{p-[1 -  F(ri)] + poF(rz)}).  (16) 
Note that the second  expression  in large parentheses  measures exam- 
ination  costs: the  fraction  1 -  F(ri) of  those  in group  i commit  act i 
and report i, so they are examined  with probability pi; the remaining 
18 The  analysis in the Appendix  demonstrating  that the s!l and r4  equal zero suggests 
that welfare could be further  increased  if negative  sanctions-rewards-for  telling the 
truth and  for not doing  harm were  permitted  (contrary to actual practice).  However, 
if we  allowed  for  rewards  of  up  to  some  limit,  as Border  and  Sobel  (1987)  did,  our 
results would not change.  (Mookherjee  and Png [1989]  impose  no such constraint and 
use the assumption  of  risk aversion  to limit the optimal  size of  rewards.) 
19  We verify this in our discussion  paper  (Kaplow and Shavell  1991). OPTIMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  593 
fraction of those  in group i do not commit act i, so they report 0 and 
are examined  with probability po. 
We  now  prove  the  analogue  of  proposition  2,  that  any  behavior 
resulting  under  a scheme  without  self-reporting  can be induced  with 
self-reporting  at  a lower  enforcement  cost.  Let p  >  0  and  s1 (i  = 
1, . ..  ,  n) apply without  self-reporting.  With self-reporting,  set ri = 
psi and ro =  0; also, set the sij as in (12) and (13) and the pi as in (15). 
The decision whether to commit acts will be the same as it was without 
self-reporting  (because  ri =  psi), so the  integrals  in (9) and  (16) will 
be equal. To compare  enforcement  costs, observe from (15) that, with 
self-reporting,  for  all i, pi '  Po =  Mrs.  Moreover,  r =  psj for  someJ, 
so p  =  /-Isj >  :-i/.  Therefore,  from  (15), pi  p for  all i, and pi < p 
for all i  >  0 such  that si >  0.20  Thus,  the  enforcement  cost term  in 
(16)  is  strictly less  than  that  in  (9)  (because  only  the  deterred  are 
examined  with the highest  probability rather than the entire popula- 
tion). This  establishes  the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  6. In the n-act model,  given any enforcement  scheme 
(involving  p  >  0) without  self-reporting,  there  exists  a scheme  with 
self-reporting  under  which  behavior  is  the  same  but  enforcement 
costs are lower. 
At this point,  we  can  determine  the  optimal  ex  ante  sanctions  by 
maximizing  (16) over the ri, where the pi are determined  by (15). For 
any r, <  r, we have 
dW  = oi  ((hi -  ri)f(ri)  -  c  (Po -  pf)f(ri)  + [1 -  F(ri)] 
r)- 
j)}.  (17) 
The  first term in large  parentheses  in (17) is the direct social benefit 
from  deterring  the  marginal  individual  in group  i from  committing 
act i: harm h, is avoided,  but his benefits  of ri are lost (the marginal 
individual's benefit  equals the sanction ri). The  remainder  of the ex- 
pression  is the  change  in examination  costs. The  first component  is 
a cost arising because  individuals  who are deterred  are examined  at 
rate po rather  than  at  rate pi (and  [15]  implies  po  >  pi for  r. >  0 
because r*  =  0). The  second  component  is a benefit  arising because 
those who commit  act i (the fraction  1 -  F(ri)  of group  i) are exam- 
ined  less frequently  (from  [15], the  optimal pi falls as ri rises).2'  Be- 
20  If sI  =  0 for all i, ri =  0, which  implies pi =  0,  for all i, in which case the  result 
that enforcement  costs can be lowered  with self-reporting  follows  trivially. 
21 This  follows  because  the  numerator  of  the  derivative  of  (15) with respect  to ri is 
r  -  s, which  is negative  because  we  assume  that s  2  h_ and  demonstrate  below  that 
T*  <  hn.  Without  our  assumption,  the  numerator  could  equal  zero;  i.e.,  r*  =  S is 
possible.  (If c is sufficiently  small and s <  hn, dW/dr in [19] can be positive  at r  =  S.) 
It should  be noted  that if j*  =  s, then pi*  =  1 for all i such that ri* <  r* (see [15]).  In 
this case,  ri* =  hi for  all hi <  r*.  (In  [17], po  =  pi and  r  =  s,  so dW/dr. =  0O(h-  - 594  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
cause these two components  have opposite  signs, hi -  ri may be posi- 
tive or  negative  at an  interior  optimum  when  dW/dri =  0.22  Thus, 
ri* may  be  such  that  there  is either  underdeterrence  or  overdeter- 
rence  relative to first-best behavior. 
Using  (17),  we can show  that ri* >  0 for  any ri* <  Tr*  (other  than 
rf),  because  dW/dr- at ri =  0 is positive.  Specifically, the first term in 
large  parentheses  is hJf(0),  which  is positive;  the  first component  of 
the  second  term  is zero  (for,  from  [15], pi =  po at ri =  0); and  the 
second  component  of the second  term is positive. The  explanation  is 
that increasing  r, from  zero  has deterrence  benefits  and reduces  the 
rate at which individuals  of type  i must be examined. 
It also follows from  (17) that, for any ri*  and rj*  (other than r*) less 
than -r*, 
h. > h. #  >  r].  (18) 
That  is,  the  ex  ante  sanction  (which,  after  all, equals  the  expected 
sanction) increases with the harm for those not subject to the highest 
sanction.  The  proof  is in the Appendix. 
We now determine  the optimal level of -r.  Let I be the set of positive 
i such that ri =  1. Then,  varying  Tr  for all i E I, we obtain23 
dW  -  -  + F(r) 
Lid  'J\  -j 
(19) 
-  >  I FL(r)  +  F(ri)1 
iI  S -  ri  s 
The  summation  in  (19)  over  i  E  I  has  an  interpretation  similar to 
that of (17), except  for the last component:  in (17), those who commit 
the act (the fraction  1 -  F(ri)) are examined  at a lower rate because 
pi  falls as ri increases; in (19), those who are deterred  (the fraction F(-) 
ri)f(ri).)  Also, our results concerning  the relationship  among  the ri  and the advantage 
of  self-reporting  (those  subject to 77  need  not be examined)  would  hold. 
22 Because  the first component  is a marginal effect  and the second  an inframarginal 
effect,  the relationship  of the two will depend  on, among other things, the shape of the 
distribution f  Q).  It can be demonstrated  that there  exist parameters  and distributions 
consistent  with  our  assumptions  such  that  either  component  may  dominate  at  the 
optimum. 
23 If n  =  1, (19) reduces  to 
dW 
=  (h1 -  r)f(r)  -  cpof(r)  --F(r 
C~r  S 
which is what is obtained  in the one-act  model  by differentiating  W in (5) with respect 
to r, using  the  relationship  r  =  ps.  (To  facilitate the comparison  to a scheme  without 
self-reporting,  we had  differentiated  W with respect  to p rather than r in the one-act 
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of group i) must be examined  at a higher rate, because po increases as 
r increases.  The  summation  over  the  i ?  I  is the  cost of  examining 
individuals  not  subject  to  r more  frequently  (from  [15],  all  the pi, 
including  po, rise with r). 
Observe  that all the  terms  except  the  first component  of  the  first 
summation,  (hi  -  -r)f(-r), are  negative.  Thus,  if  dWI/r  =  0  at the 
optimum,  the sum over i E I of the first components  must be positive; 
that  is,  on  average,  there  must  be  underdeterrence  of  individuals 
subject to the highest  sanction.  It need  not be the case, however,  that 
all acts subject to -r  are underdeterred  at the optimum.24 
Now  let us show that some  degree  of enforcement  is optimal;  that 
is, r* >  0. Suppose  that Tr  =  0, so that I  =  {1, .  . , n}, and consider 
raising all the ri (except  ro) uniformly.  Evaluating the expression  for 
marginal welfare  (19) at zero yields 
dW  n:- 
-=  A,  Q0hjf(0)  >  0.  (20)  dr  ~ 
Thus,  r'*  >  0.  From  (15),  this implies  p*  >  0, so some  enforcement 
effort  is applied  at the optimum.  The  reason  is essentially that given 
for part b of  proposition  3 in Section  II: when  the sanctions ri for all 
the  acts are  raised  simultaneously  from  zero,  there  is a first-order 
social benefit  due  to deterrence,  but no first-order  examination  cost 
is borne  because  no one  is being  examined. 
Finally, we prove in the Appendix  that the acts subject to the largest 
ex ante sanction, or, are the  most  harmful  acts; that is, if ri* <  r  = 
ir,  then  h, <  hJ. 
Our  results about  the optimal  self-reporting  mechanism  are sum- 
marized  in the  following  two propositions.25 
PROPOSITION  7.  Under  the  optimal  self-reporting  scheme  in  the 
n-act model,  the following  conclusions  hold: 
a)  All individuals  report  their behavior  truthfully. 
b)  Individuals  who  commit  act i pay a certain  ex  ante  sanction  r`I 
and no more,  for there is no ex post sanction for having told the 
24 For an overdeterred  act,  say act k, to be  subject to r at the  optimum,  dWldrk  in 
(17)  must  be  positive  when  evaluated  at  r.  This  possibility  cannot  be  ruled  out. 
Although  overdeterrence  implies that the first term in (17) is negative  and (15) implies 
that the  second  term  is negative  (Pk =  0 at rk =  r), the third term is positive. 
25 In the  mechanism  design  literature  on  auditing  cited  in n.  2, it also generally  is 
true that efficient  auditing  involves maximal penalties  for lying, no penalties for telling 
the truth,  and  greater  audit  probabilities  for reports  associated  with lower payments. 
But  our  characterization  of  the  optimal  ri and  their  relationship  to the  hi (as well as 
our extensions  in Sec. IV) is not contained  in the auditing  literature,  since it does  not 
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truth: s,,*  =  0. Also,  the  ex  post sanction  for lying can be taken 
to be maximal:  s5  =  S -  r* for ij. 
c)  Some  individuals  are  deterred  from  committing  each  of  the 
harmful  acts. (i) The  ex ante  sanction  is positive  for all harmful 
acts and  zero  for not  committing  a harmful  act; the r* rise with 
the  level  of  harm  until  reaching  a maximum  i*  at some  hj and 
are r* thereafter,  that is, 0  =  <r<...<r*  =  .<.  .  = 
r*;  r* and  the  lesser r* are determined  by setting  (19) and (17), 
respectively,  equal to zero.  (ii) The  most harmful  act is underde- 
terred  relative  to first-best behavior,  that is, r* <  hn; other  acts 
may be underdeterred  or overdeterred,  although  acts subject to 
the highest  ex ante sanction  r* are underdeterred  on average. 
d)  The  probability of  examination  is highest  for  those  who  report 
not having committed  a harmful act; for those who report having 
committed  harmful  acts, the p* fall with the level of  harm until 
reaching  zero  for  the  most  harmful  acts  (those  subject  to  the 
highest  ex  ante  sanction  r), that is, p*  >  >  . ..  >  p*=  . 
=  =  0. The  p* are given by (15). 
PROPOSITION  8.  In  the  n-act  model,  the  optimal  self-reporting 
scheme  is superior  to the optimal  scheme  without  self-reporting. 
Observe  that  proposition  7 justifies  implicit  assumptions  made  in 
the  one-act  model  in  Section  II.  There  we assumed  that those  who 
commit  the  harmful  act (which is trivially the  most harmful  act) are 
not  examined,  those  who  do  not  report  having  committed  the  act 
pay no ex ante sanction,  and those who truthfully  report not having 
committed  the act bear no ex  post sanction.  Proposition  7 states that 
each of  these  restrictions  on the enforcement  mechanism  is in fact a 
feature  of  the optimal  mechanism. 
Finally,  let  us  note  the  consequences  of  relaxing  the  assumption 
that  each  individual  chooses  between  committing  one  harmful  act 
and not acting. Instead we can allow individuals to choose  among any 
of the n harmful  acts or not acting, which presents  the issue of mar- 
ginal deterrence.26 In this case,  an individual  will choose  the  act for 
which the excess  of  the benefit  over the expected  sanction is largest, 
unless  the  net  benefit  of  that act is negative,  in which  event  he will 
not commit a harmful  act.27  Elsewhere,  we sketch an argument  estab- 
26  Stigler  (1970)  first used  the  term  "marginal deterrence"  because  an individual's 
choice  between  two harmful  acts depends  on  the  difference,  or margin,  between  ex- 
pected  sanctions  for the two acts. 
27 Specifically,  an  individual  is assumed  to  obtain  a benefit  bi if  he  commits  act i, 
where  the b are independently  and identically  distributed  according  to the previously 
described  densityf(-).  Thus,  individuals  choose  the act i that maximizes  bi -  ri, unless 
this maximum  is negative. OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  597 
fishing that our results continue  to hold in the case of marginal deter- 
rence, except  that the first-order conditions  determining  the optimal 
ri must be modified  (see Kaplow and Shavell  1991). 
IV.  Extensions 
In this section, we discuss extensions  of our analysis, illustrating them 
in the one-act  model  for convenience. 
A.  Risk Aversion 
Our  main  results  hold  when  individuals  are  risk-averse  (although 
the characterizations  of the optimal probability and ex ante sanctions 
differ  because  the certainty equivalent  of sanctions  rather than their 
expected  value determines  behavior)  (see Kaplow and Shavell  1991). 
Achievable  welfare  is greater with self-reporting  than without  it, but 
now there  are two reasons:  enforcement  costs are reduced  and risk- 
bearing  costs are eliminated.  Risk is not borne  by those who commit 
harmful  acts because  they are induced  to report and thus pay a sanc- 
tion r with certainty.  Finally, because  no risk is borne,  the optimal ex 
post  sanction  is s  (as  it  was  in  Sec.  II).  By  contrast,  without  self- 
reporting  the optimal  enforcement  scheme  may change  substantially 
when  individuals  are risk-averse;  in particular,  the optimal  sanction 
may be less than maximal  (see Polinsky and Shavell  1979). 
B.  Imprisonment  as a Sanction 
Suppose  that  imprisonment,  a  socially  costly  sanction,  may  be  em- 
ployed  as  a  supplement  to  monetary  sanctions,  which  we  have  as- 
sumed  to  be  socially  costless  to  impose  when  individuals  are  risk- 
neutral  (as we assume  is true in this subsection).  Then  schemes  with 
self-reporting  have  the  additional  advantage  that  society  can  enjoy 
the  deterrence  benefits  of  imprisonment  without  imposing  any im- 
prisonment,  or imposing  it to a lesser extent  than in schemes without 
self-reporting.28 
Let  us  demonstrate  this  advantage  in  the  one-act  model.  Denote 
the  ex  post  monetary  sanction  by sl,  where  s1 '  s-  (the  maximum 
monetary sanction, perhaps equal to wealth), and the ex post sanction 
of imprisonment  by S2, where S2  '  s2 (the maximum  term of imprison- 
ment).  The  disutility of  sanctions  to individuals  is s, where  s  =  s1 + 
S2;  the social cost of imposing  S2 is  lqS2,  where  q >  0. Observe  that it 
28 For a discussion  of  the  optimal  use  of  fines  and  imprisonment,  see  Polinsky and 
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is desirable  for society to employ  monetary  sanctions to their limit s- 
before  resorting  to imprisonment:  otherwise,  S2 could be lowered and 
sI  raised,  keeping  s (and  thus  behavior)  the  same  but  reducing  the 
social costs of  using  imprisonment. 
Suppose  that,  without  self-reporting,  imprisonment  is employed 
probabilistically; that is, s  =SI  +  S2,  where  S2  >  0,  and  0  <  p  <  1. 
With self-reporting,  choose  r  =  ps.  As before,  individuals'  behavior 
will be the same as without  self-reporting,  and there will be the usual 
advantage  of  conserving  on  examination  costs  because  those  who 
commit  the  harmful  act are induced  to report  it and are not exam- 
ined.  Now,  however,  there  is the  further  advantage  of  reducing  the 
use  of  imprisonment.  Specifically,  define  r,  and  r2 as  the  ex  ante 
monetary  sanction  and  the  ex  ante  term  of  imprisonment,  respec- 
tively. Then  r  =  ps  is equivalent  to r,  +  r2  =  P(sI  +  S2)* If r  '  SI, 
set r,  =  r and r2 =  0; hence,  there  is no imprisonment,  producing  a 
savings of pqs2.  If r >  -sI, set r,  =  -s  and r2 =  P(sI  +  S2)  -  S;  then 
the  savings  in  imprisonment  costs  is (1  -  p),srP. The  advantage  of 
self-reporting  in  this  latter  case  is that sI is imposed  with  certainty 
rather than only with probability p, so that the use of  imprisonment 
is diminished  by (1  -  p)S . 
The  idea  underlying  the  argument  discussed  above  may  be  ex- 
pressed  informally  as follows.  With self-reporting,  the ex  ante  sanc- 
tions that are actually imposed  on an individual  are lower in magni- 
tude by a factor of  1 -  p than those  that are necessary to impose  ex 
post without  self-reporting.  Because  costless  monetary  sanctions  are 
used  before  imprisonment,  this  reduction  in  the  magnitude  of  im- 
posed  sanctions  with self-reporting  allows society to reduce  or elimi- 
nate the actual imposition  of  imprisonment. 
The  conclusion  that  imprisonment  costs  can  be  saved  with  self- 
reporting  is relevant  whenever  imprisonment  would  be desirable  to 
impose  without  self-reporting.  But even  when  imprisonment  would 
not  be  desirable  without  self-reporting,  the  threat of  imprisonment 
as an ex post sanction  for those  who fail to report their harmful  acts 
always enhances  the  advantages  of  self-reporting  schemes.  A  given 
level  of  deterrence-a  given  ex  ante  sanction  r-can  be  achieved 
more cheaply,  with a lower probability of examination,  because those 
who  would  report  falsely  face  a greater  ex  post  sanction.  Further- 
more, because ex post sanctions are never actually imposed,  no social 
costs of imprisonment  are incurred. 
C.  Errors in Examinations 
We  assumed  throughout  that  individuals'  true  behavior  would  be 
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Suppose  instead  that  their  behavior  is  sometimes  assessed  erro- 
neously.  This  will decrease  achievable  welfare  in  schemes  with  and 
without self-reporting  but (perhaps surprisingly) will increase the rel- 
ative advantage  of  self-reporting  schemes. 
Assume  that if  a person  does  not  commit  the  harmful  act and  is 
examined,  he  will  mistakenly  be  found  to  have  committed  the  act 
with probability q1; if he commits  the harmful  act and is examined, 
he  will  erroneously  be  found  not  to  have  committed  the  act with 
probability q0. 
Without  self-reporting,  an  individual  who  does  not  commit  the 
harmful  act bears an expected  sanction of pqls  rather than zero, and 
a  person  who  does  commit  the  act  bears  an  expected  sanction  of 
p(I  -  qo)s rather  than ps. Thus,  individuals  will commit  the  act if 
and only if 
b :  ps(I  -  q0 -  q1).  (21) 
Now  let  us  demonstrate  that with  self-reporting  the  same  behavior 
can be achieved  as without  self-reporting,  but at lower enforcement 
cost. Keep p and s at the same levels as without self-reporting  and set 
r  =  p(1  -  qo)s. If  a person  commits  the  harmful  act and  does  not 
report  it, the expected  sanction  will be p(1  -  qo)s, so he will report 
it; if he does  not commit  the  act, the expected  sanction  will be pqls. 
Thus,  individuals  will  commit  the  harmful  act  if  and  only  if  (21) 
holds, the same condition  as without  self-reporting.  Although  behav- 
ior  is  the  same  under  both  schemes,  enforcement  costs  with  self- 
reporting  are  lower  by  [1  -  F(ps(I  -  q0 -  ql))]pc, because  those 
who commit  the act are not examined.  Moreover,  observe  from  (21) 
that  as the  magnitude  of  errors  q0 and  q1 increases,  the  level  of  p 
necessary  to  achieve  a given  level  of  deterrence  increases  with  and 
without  self-reporting  (by the same amount),  so achievable welfare  is 
reduced  in  both  schemes.  The  savings  in  enforcement  costs  under 
self-reporting,  however,  are greater: the benefit  from not examining 
those who  report  committing  the act rises when p must be increased 
on account  of error to maintain  deterrence. 
Because individuals who do not commit the harmful act might mis- 
takenly be  deemed  to  have  committed  it, the  imposition  of  ex  post 
sanctions  is  not  entirely  avoided  under  self-reporting.29  Conse- 
quently,  when  individuals  are  risk-averse  or  imprisonment  is used, 
social  costs  associated  with  the  ex  post  imposition  of  sanctions  are 
incurred,  and  it may be optimal  to adjust the  enforcement  scheme, 
notably by lowering  sanctions.  But  the  advantages  of  self-reporting 
29 Observe  that all who  are sanctioned  for false reporting  are indeed  innocent,  but 
the reason  is that all the  guilty are induced  to admit their guilt initially. 6oo  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
with regard  to saving  risk-bearing  costs and imprisonment  costs are 
still present.  Consider  a given p and s. Individuals who do not commit 
the  harmful  act  are  in  the  same  situation  with  and  without  self- 
reporting:  they  are exposed  to  the  same  chance  of  bearing  ex  post 
sanctions through  error. But individuals who commit the act are sub- 
ject  to  ex  post  sanctions  only  when  there  is no  self-reporting;  with 
self-reporting,  such  individuals  report  committing  the  act  and  are 
subject to ex ante sanctions  alone.  Thus,  schemes  with self-reporting 
continue  to have  the benefit  of  reducing  sanctioning  costs for  those 
who commit harmful acts. Moreover,  to achieve a given level of deter- 
rence  in  schemes  without  self-reporting,  greater  sanctioning  costs 
must  be  incurred  for  those  who  commit  harmful  acts when  errors 
sometimes  are made,  so this advantage  of self-reporting  is enhanced. 
D.  Administrative  Costs  of Self-Reporting 
We assumed  in  the  model  that  the  only  social costs associated  with 
enforcement  were the costs of examining  individuals' behavior. How- 
ever, processing  reports  and collecting  payments  involve administra- 
tive costs. This  is a disadvantage  of  self-reporting  because,  when  an 
individual  reports  his behavior  and pays a sanction,  society bears ad- 
ministrative costs with certainty, whereas  without  self-reporting  soci- 
ety bears administrative  costs only with a probability.30 
To  illustrate,  assume  that  collecting  a positive  payment,  whether 
ex  ante  or  ex  post,  involves  a fixed  administrative  cost  d. Without 
self-reporting,  the level of  social welfare  previously  given by expres- 
sion (1) is reduced  by pd[1  -  F(ps)],  because  those  who commit  the 
harmful  act and  are examined  make  payments.  With self-reporting, 
the level of welfare  previously  given by (5) is reduced  by d[  1  -  F(r)], 
because  those  who commit  the act make payments  with certainty.  In 
this  case,  the  argument  of  proposition  2-that  the  same  behavior 
can be induced  with self-reporting  as without  it but at a lower social 
cost-may  no  longer  hold.  If r is set equal  to ps, the  same behavior 
is produced  under  self-reporting,  but the savings in enforcement  and 
administrative  costs are now 
[1 -  F(r)][pc  -  (1 -  p)d].  (22) 
30 A related effect would arise if imprisonment  were the only sanction and individuals 
were  risk-averse  with  respect  to  this  sanction.  Then  the  ex  ante  sanction  required 
to keep  deterrence  unchanged  would  exceed  the  expected  amount  of  imprisonment 
imposed  with ex  post,  probabilistic  sanctions,  making  self-reporting  more  expensive. 
Our conjecture,  however,  is that individuals' preferences  with respect to imprisonment 
are  probably  convex:  the  first  year  of  a  sentence  imposes  more  disutility  than  an 
additional  year. OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  6o1 
The  savings  depend  on  the  fraction  of  the  population  who  commit 
the act and  report  this under  self-reporting,  1 -  F(r), because  indi- 
viduals who do not commit  the act are subject to the same treatment 
under  both  schemes.  For  those  who  commit  the  act, self-reporting 
schemes  save  pc because  examinations  need  not  be  conducted  for 
those who commit  the act, whereas  examinations  otherwise  would be 
conducted  with probability p at unit cost c. But self-reporting  schemes 
involve  the  additional  cost  (1  -  p) d because  payments  must be col- 
lected  at unit cost d from  those  who would  not have been  examined 
without  self-reporting  (the  fraction  1  -  p). Whether  self-reporting 
remains preferable  depends  on whether  c and p are sufficiently  large 
relative to V' 
V.  Concluding  Remarks 
A.  Methods  of Enforcement  and the Value of 
Self-Reporting 
In the situations with which we were concerned,  an enforcement  au- 
thority learns both whether  a harmful  act occurred  and who commit- 
ted  it  through  examination of  an  individual.  A  somewhat  different 
situation  arises when  an enforcement  authority  knows at the  outset 
about the occurrence  of  a harmful  act and undertakes  enforcement 
effort  solely to determine  who committed  it. For example,  the police 
may know  that a crime  has occurred,  but not who  committed  it, be- 
fore they proceed  to determine  who that person  is. We shall refer to 
enforcement  effort  in such contexts  as investigation. 
When enforcement  occurs by investigation,  self-reporting  does not 
merely  reduce  enforcement  costs, it eliminates  them:  once  someone 
confesses,  others  need  not  be  investigated.  (With  examination,  by 
comparison,  one  person's admission  that he committed  a harmful  act 
does not rule out the possibility that others  may also have committed 
harmful acts.) To realize this savings in enforcement  costs, individuals 
must  be  induced  to  admit  committing  harmful  acts, and  (as in our 
model)  this can best be accomplished  by setting  the ex ante sanction 
for those  who  confess  equal  to the expected  ex  post sanction.  Thus, 
the reduction  in the sanction for admitting one's act should be greater 
the lower the probability of apprehending  the person through investi- 
31 In  the  n-act  model,  it  may  not  be  optimal  to  have  individuals  report  and  pay 
positive ex ante sanctions for acts whose harm is below some threshold  (because raising 
ri from zero requires that the administrative  cost of reporting  be incurred).  These  acts 
would  be subject only  to ex  post  sanctions  (set to optimize  deterrence,  as when  there 
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gation  would  have  been.32 Accordingly,  if  a person  confesses  when 
the  police  have  little evidence  (such  as immediately  after  a crime  is 
committed),  the  reduction  in  his  sanction  should  be  large;  but  if  a 
person  confesses  when  the  police  have  already  gathered  substantial 
evidence  against him,  the reduction  should  be small. 
Another  enforcement  method  is monitoring:  the posting of enforce- 
ment  agents  to observe  violations  among  any of  a population,  such 
as when  police  are  stationed  at  the  roadside.  Monitoring  is useful 
when  a single  agent  is readily  able to spot  any violations  that occur 
within sight of his post. (Monitoring  is not enough,  and examination 
or investigation  is necessary,  when  extra  effort  is required  to detect 
any particular individual's  violation.) 
When  monitoring  is  the  enforcement  method,  there  may  be  no 
achievable  cost  savings  under  self-reporting.  For  example,  even  if 
individuals who wish to speed or make illegal left turns were to report 
this in advance  to the police,  there would be little if any reduction  in 
the  number  of  posted  officers  required  to maintain  the  probability 
of apprehension  for other  drivers who might  commit  violations. 
B.  Why  Individuals Might Not Report Truthfully 
In  the  model  (as well  as in  the  extensions  of  it), individuals  report 
truthfully  given  socially optimal  enforcement.  We do  not,  however, 
observe all individuals  reporting  the truth. There  are three plausible 
explanations  for  this.  First,  an  optimal  mechanism  may  not  be  in 
place: the  reduction  in the  sanction  for admitting  harmful  acts may 
be too low to induce  individuals  to self-report  in light of the probabil- 
ity of  apprehension.  Second,  even  if informed  individuals  would  be 
induced  to report their acts, some may underestimate  the probability 
or magnitude  of the sanction.  Similarly, some individuals  may not be 
aware of the nature of the acts that they have committed  (see Kaplow 
1992).  (For example,  a firm may not  know  that a chemical  it uses is 
a regulated  toxic substance.) Third,  some individuals may know from 
their circumstances  that detection  is relatively unlikely. 
C.  Use of Self-Reporting 
That  self-reporting  is a frequently  observed  feature  of  law enforce- 
ment is consistent with our analysis, for it seems that in many contexts 
significant  enforcement  resources  or sanction  costs are saved by in- 
ducing  people  to  come  forward  with  information  about  their  con- 
32 The  necessary  reduction  is s  -  r =  s  -  ps  =  s(I  -  p). OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  603 
duct.33 At the same time, it is not surprising  that self-reporting  is not 
observed  in  some  instances.  With  regard  to the  example  of  driving 
violations (such as improper  left turns) that are not reported  by those 
who  commit  them,  two of  the  limitations  of  self-reporting  are rele- 
vant: the  administrative  cost of  processing  reports  of  many  types of 
driving  violations  would  be large  relative to the expected  harm, and 
the number of police necessary to maintain a given level of deterrence 
would  not be much  reduced  if some  violations  were reported. 
It  does  not  appear,  however,  that  the  benefits  of  self-reporting 
are fully realized  in practice. The  incentives  to report  one's conduct 
frequently  seem  weak, because  the reduction  in penalties  for parties 
who admit harmful behavior is often  modest even when the probabil- 
ity of  punishment  for those  not reporting  their violations is substan- 
tially less  than  one.  When  this is the  case,  increasing  incentives  for 
reporting  harmful  acts  would  induce  more  reporting  and  raise 
welfare. 
Finally, we  remark  that  although  we  have  focused  on  public  en- 
forcement  of law, our discussion  is more broadly relevant, notably to 
enforcement  of  incentive  schemes  in  private  contractual  arrange- 
ments. For example,  employers  may have a policy of treating employ- 
ees who admit to drug  use or pilferage  more favorably than employ- 
ees  who  are  found  out.  Inducing  employees  to  report  their  own 
misconduct  reduces  the employer's  need  to police employee  behavior 
and also the need  to impose  costly sanctions  (such as dismissal). 
Appendix 
Because the revelation principle applies (see Kaplow  and Shavell 1991), we 
may assume that reports are truthful. Thus, the following  incentive  compati- 
bility  constraints,  denoted by ICi,  must hold for all i and j: 
ri + p sc  rj + pjsj,.  (A1) 
This constraint  requires that the expected sanction  if a person commits  act i 
and tells the truth does not exceed the expected sanction if he reports j 
instead. 
We now demonstrate equation (12), which states that, for i  $  j,  s*  - 
-  ri is an optimal sanction for lying. If (12) did not hold, one could alter 
the mechanism  by raising  sij to the point at which (12) does hold. Since ICj, 
is satisfied under the original mechanism, it would be satisfied under the 
altered mechanism, because the right side of ICj, would be greater and the 
left side would be unaffected. Moreover, individuals'  choices of acts would 
be unaffected by raising any s4, because no individual would bear s4,  since 
33 Another reason self-reporting  may be used in some contexts is to reduce harm: 
early identification  of a toxic spill may facilitate  mitigation  of its effects. 604  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
all would report truthfully.  Thus, social  welfare under the altered  mechanism 
would be the same as under the original one. 
Next we show (13), that sit =  0. If (13) did not hold, one could alter the 
mechanism  by lowering  sii  to zero and raising  ri  by pisii.  This alteration  would 
not affect IC  4: the left side would have the same value, and the right side 
would be unaffected. For the ICfi, j #  i, however, a higher ri would increase 
the right side and the left side would be unaffected; thus,  pi  could be lowered, 
which would reduce enforcement costs.34  Finally,  because the expected sanc- 
tion for truthful reports under this altered mechanism  would be the same as 
under the original mechanism, individuals'  choices of acts would be unaf- 
fected. Thus, social welfare would be higher under the altered mechanism. 
These two simplifications  allow ICi,  in (Al) to be rewritten  as35 
ri-  rj  pJ(s  -  r).  (A2) 
That is, any savings  in the ex ante sanction  gained by reportingj rather than 
the true act i cannot exceed the expected ex post sanction for lying. 
Using (A2), we can establish (14), that rt  =  0. First, we show that the 
lowest of the ri, which we denote r, must equal zero. If r > 0, one could alter 
the mechanism by reducing each of the ri by r and raising the s4, for i $ j, 
as indicated  by (12). This change would not affect the left side of ICi,  in (A2) 
and would raise the right side, so the IC4  would continue to hold. Moreover, 
each of the IC  4 could be satisfied with lower pj, so enforcement costs could 
be reduced. Finally, it is apparent that individuals'  choices of acts would 
be unaffected, so welfare would be higher under the altered mechanism. 
Second, ri  =  r. If not, rk =  O  for some k > O, since r =  0. Let K =  {kIrk  = 
O}  and alter the mechanism  by increasing  all the rk, k E K, by the same small 
amount, in particular small enough that rk <  rm  for all m ?  K (including 
m =  0). The constraints  ICik will continue to hold. (If i  t K, the increase in 
rk  will relax the constraint;  if i E K, the constraint  will still be satisfied  because 
the left side equals zero and the right side is nonnegative.) The constraints 
ICk; will continue  to hold  as well. (The  left side will be negative  if j 0  K, and 
zero  otherwise.)  Finally,  increasing  the  rk will  not  affect  behavior:  rk -  ro 
is negative  before  and  after  the  alteration,  so all individuals  in group  k, for 
k E  K, commit  their  act regardless.  Thus,  if ro >  0, the  optimal  r need  not 
equal zero,  a contradiction. 
Next,  let  us  demonstrate  that  the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  IC4 
are binding  for  reports  of  acts subject to 7 and  for  no  others;  that is, IC4 is 
binding  if and only if ri =  7. First, the constraints  for reports  not subject to 
7 are  not  binding.  This  is apparent  from  (A2):  the  left  side  is greater  the 
greater  is ri and  the  right  side is independent  of ri, so the constraint  can be 
binding  only if r- =  T. To  prove  that the constraints  are binding  for reports 
subject to 7, suppose  instead  that 7  -  rj <  pj(3  -  r1) for  some j.  Alter  the 
mechanism  by lowering  pj  such  that  this  inequality  continues  to  hold.  The 
constraint IC4, in (A2) will continue  to hold  for all i. Also,  this reduction  in 
34 If  pi in the optimal mechanism were zero, the argument in the text would not 
hold. But the level of sat  would not affect behavior,  so sii  could be taken to be zero. 
35 Note that (A2) holds trivially  if i  =  j. OPTIMAL  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  605 
pj does not alter individuals'  choices of acts (because the ri are the same). 
But reducing pj saves enforcement costs, so welfare is higher. Because the 
constraints  (A2) are binding when ri = T,  the optimal probabilities  are given 
by (15). 
Finally,  we demonstrate the relationships  between the hi and the optimal 
r.. First,  we prove (18), that for any ri*  and rj*  (other than r*) less than r*, hi 
>  hj implies ri*  >  rj*.  Observe that for any positive constant X, the function 
XW  is maximized  at the same ri as W is. In particular,  (I/0r)  W is maximized 
with respect to r. at rim  and (I/0) W is maximized  with respect to rj  at rj*.  Now, 
from (17), for any r E  [0, r-],  [(1/O)dW/drJ]  -  [(1/0j)dW/drj]  =  (hi -h)  f(r), 
which is positive.36  Thus, ri* = rj*  is ruled out. Also, rib  <  rj*  is impossible: 
because rj*  maximizes  (1/0) W(rj),  this expression's  value at rj*  cannot be ex- 
ceeded by its value at ri*;  but then the value of (1/O)W(r.)  must be greater 
at rj*  than at ri*  because the difference in the derivatives  is positive over the 
interval [ri, rif , which contradicts  the optimality  of r,*. 
Second, we show that if r  K  rj* =  -r,  then hi <  hp.  To see this, assume 
otherwise, that hi >  hj. Consider first the case in which there is more than 
one type of act subject  to -r*.  Then the derivative  of welfare with respect to 
both r,  and ri  in the interval  [0, -r*]  is given by expression  (17), so the argument 
demonstrating (18) establishes that rib  >  rj*,  a contradiction.  Now consider 
the case in which only act  j is subject to -r*.  Using expression (19), observe 
that, at  -r*, 
-0  r(hj-rj*)f(rj*)  - cPof(rj*)]  >  0,  (A3) 
because all the other terms in (19) are negative. This implies that 
on  [(h,,  -  r*)f(r*) -  cpof(r*)]  > 0,  (A4) 
because h  > h, and r* <  rK*.  But then, from (17), dW/dr >  0 at r*, because 
(A4) is the first two components of (17) and all the other components are 
also positive.  This contradicts  the optimality  of r*. 
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